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Introduction
For a variety of reasons, public
opinion of the legal profession as a
whole is less than favorable. While the
negative attitude toward attorneys may
be actually justified by only an occa-
sional instance of serious misconduct,
the issue of poor public image is one all
members of the profession must address.
Perhaps one of the most damaging-
but unfortunately pervasive-stereotypes
is of the attorney as thief or "shyster."
Attorneys hold assets belonging to their
clients in a variety of contexts: settle-
ments from lawsuits, funds collected by
the attorney on behalf of the client, real
estate deposits held in escrow, fines to
be paid on the client's behalf, advances
for costs, and prepaid legal fees for
specific services yet to be performed by
the attorney. Rule 1.15 of the American
Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of
Professional Conduct' requires that any
funds belonging to a client be main-
tained in a separate bank account apart
from funds belonging to a lawyer or his
firm. The same rule also requires the
attorney to maintain complete records
of all clients' funds, render an account-
ing to clients as to their funds, and
promptly pay clients all funds in the
lawyer's possession which are due them.
Breaches of professional ethics in
handling clients' funds occur in a variety
of circumstances. An attorney's failure
to establish a separate bank account for
clients' funds and the resulting com-
mingling of a lawyer's funds with those
of her client constitute grounds for disci-
pline, although such a violation of Rule
1.15 is not necessarily an indication of
illegal intentions or future misappropri-
ation.2 Frequently, commingling is com-
bined with inadequate bookkeeping,
which precludes the attorney from de-
termining whether he is spending his
own money or that of his clients.3 The
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consequence is often misappropriation,
which began as careless and uninten-
tional conduct but gradually evolved
into embezzlement as the "borrowing"
continued and increased in amount.4 On
the other hand, many other cases of
misappropriation unfortunately involve
attorneys who deliberately steal from
their clients.
The legal profession's response to
the problem of attorney misappropria-
tion traditionally has been limited to
establishing and enforcing standards for
admission to and expulsion from the
bar. Within the past 25 years, however,
almost every state has established a
client security fund (CSF),5 either by
promulgation of court rules or through
the actions of state bar associations, in
order to provide a mechanism for com-
pensating clients injured through attor-
ney dishonesty. Subject to maximum
dollar limitations for any single award,
6
the CSF reimburses defrauded clients
presenting eligible claims.
The first part of this article describes
the general operation and administra-
tion of a client security fund, using Cali-
fornia's CSF as an illustrative example.
The second section discusses the public
policies underlying the creation of
CSFs, and critiques the actual perform-
ance of CSFs in achieving articulated
policy goals. The conclusion makes recom-
mendations for reform and suggests
areas for further exploration.
The Client Security Fund
The CSF is a means by which mem-
bers of the legal profession contribute
their own money to reimburse clients
injured by the dishonest actions of their
lawyers. Many CSFs, financed by appro-
priations from general bar dues, receive
either a fixed annual contribution from
the bar or an amount which varies from
year to year depending on the the de-
gree to which the fund has been de-
pleted by awards to clients.
7
Commissioners or trustees appointed
by the state supreme court or the state
bar administer the CSF's operations.
The trustees are authorized to manage
and invest the assets of the fund, evalu-
ate the claims of aggrieved clients, make
awards, enforce claims for restitution
arising by subrogation or assignment,
file written and financial reports, and
hire consultants, legal counsel, and
other employees.8 Generally, the trust-
ees are vested with exclusive and unre-
viewable authority in performing their
primary task, which is to determine
whether a claim merits reimbursement,
and if so, the proper amount of reim-
bursement.9
California's CSF: A Case Study.
The notion of a program funded by
attorneys to compensate clients injured
by the misconduct of fellow attorneys
was first implemented in 1929 in New
Zealand.'0 The first states in this coun-
try to adopt the idea were Vermont and
Oregon in 1958. By 1971-the time the
California State Bar successfully sought
legislation empowering it to create a
CSF, thirty-three other state bars and
twenty-one local bar associations already
had CSFs in operation.I I
The proposal to establish a CSF in
California was not readily accepted.
Critics of the fund made the following
arguments:
-The legal profession may have an
obligation to the general public, but this
obligation is performed more effectively
by carefully screening admissions to the
bar and vigorously disciplining mis-
conduct. Indemnity is not required.
2
-The plan could worsen public re-
lations and increase the problems now
confronting the Bar and its members in
their relations with the public.
3
-Adoption of a CSF would be, in the
eyes of the public, official recognition of
the fact that the legal profession is so
corrupt that it must assess itself to in-
demnify the public against the miscon-
duct of its members.
4
-The adoption of such a plan would
unjustifiably encourage and increase
charges of dishonesty against members
of the bar and charges of malpractice
based upon claims of simple negli-
gence. '
5
-The small number of misappropria-
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tion cases each year does not warrant a
remedy of this magnitude and cost. 16
-Attorneys would be encouraged to
be lax in their dealings with clients'
funds, knowing that any loss would be
made up by the fund.
17
-The fund is unable to fully compen-
sate all wronged clients. The disap-
pointment engendered by this fact may
outweigh any gains in the area of public
relations. 18
-The plan is socialistic. 19
While some of these arguments may
have merit, in 1971 the proponents of
the CSF succeeded in passing legislation
authorizing creation of California's
CSF. For seventeen years, section
6140.5 of the Business and Professions
Code has stated that the State Bar "may
establish and administer a Client Securi-
ty Fund to relieve or mitigate pecuniary
losses caused by the dishonest conduct
of the active members of the State Bar.
Any payments from the fund shall be
discretionary and shall be subject to
such regulation and conditions as the
board shall prescribe."20 The Board of
Governors was also authorized to dele-
gate the fund's administration to the
State Bar Court or any other board or
committee which it might create. The
following year, the Board of Governors
created the Client Security Fund Com-
mission to administer the fund, and
promulgated rules for the administra-
tion of the CSF.2' The Commission is
composed of seven members: four attor-
neys and three public members. Mem-
bers of the Commission are appointed
by the Board and serve at the pleasure
of the Board.
California's CSF is very similar to
funds found in other states. With re-
spect to funding and administration,
California has the advantage of having
an integrated bar with a large member-
ship and a centralized disciplinary
system already established. Currently,
all active members of the Bar are re-
quired to pay $25 annually toward the
CSF.22
Under the procedures set forth by
the Board, an eligible claimant must file
an application for reimbursement. In
order to do this, applicants must be
aware of the existence of the CSF. Prior
to 1988, individuals who filed disciplin-
ary complaints against attorneys were
not routinely notified of the existence,
scope, and reimbursement policies of
the CSF. A public outreach program
has been proposed, but is "not a pri-
ority" at this point.
23
Specific classes of individuals are
excluded from eligibility for CSF com-
pensation at the outset. For example,
relatives, associates and employees of
the attorney; insurers, bonding agencies,
and other companies seeking reimburse-
ment under an insurance or surety con-
tract covering the risk involved in the
lawyer's misconduct; any business entity
controlled by the lawyer; and govern-
ment agencies are all ineligible.
24
In addition, the attorney causing the
loss must have been acting as an attor-
ney; in a fiduciary capacity "customary
to the practice of law"; or as an escrow
holder or other fiduciary.25 The current
status of the attorney qua attorney is
also essential. Reimbursement requires
that one of the following events have
occurred: the lawyer must be dead,
mentally incompetent, disciplined, re-
signed from the practice of law, judged
guilty of a crime, or a judgment debtor
of the applicant.
26
In order for the claim to be compens-
able, the applicant must show that she
has suffered a "reimbursable loss."
27
Thus, it must be shown that the money
or property which was allegedly mis-
appropriated "came into the hands" of
an active member of the State Bar while
acting as a lawyer, trustee, or fiduciary,
and that the loss was caused by the
dishonest conduct of the attorney.
28
"Dishonest conduct" includes theft or
embezzlement of money or the wrongful
conversion of money or property; re-
fusal to return unearned fees; borrowing
money from a client without any in-
tention of repaying it; or any act of
intentional dishonesty which proxi-
mately leads to the loss of money or
property.
29
After filing, each application is
screened by counsel.30 During this
process, the Commission or its counsel
may have access to State Bar disciplin-
ary records which have not become
public.3' The application may be investi-
gated by CSF staff counsel or referred
to the State Bar Offices of Investiga-
tions or Trial Counsel for investigation
in connection with a pending disciplin-
ary matter.32 When a CSF claim in-
volves an attorney who is the respond-
ent in a pending disciplinary proceeding,
a referee of the State Bar Court may
order the two actions consolidated for
hearing before the same hearing panel.
33
The Commission itself has the authority
to take and hear evidence, and compel
the attendance of witnesses and the pro-
duction of documents. Neither the claim-
ant nor the attorney has a right to
appear before the Commission, although
either party may request to appear.
3 4
After the initial screening and investi-
gation, the Commission tentatively de-
cides what action should be taken on
the application, including possible refer-
ral to the State Bar Court for an evi-
dentiary hearing. The tentative decision
is served on the applicant and the law-
yer involved, and each is given thirty
days to file objections to the proposed
action.3 5 The Commission (or the State
Bar Court, if the claim is referred there
for evidentiary hearing) may "take what-
ever action it deems appropriate,"36 in-
cluding reimbursement from the fund,
denial of reimbursement, or referral to
the State Bar Court if the Commission
concludes this is necessary. The Commis-
sion's decision may be made with or
without prejudice to the applicant pre-
senting a further application,3 7 and
(except for applications referred to the
State Bar Court) constitutes the final
action of the State Bar.30 The Commis-
sion and the State Bar Court may post-
pone consideration of an application
until after disciplinary action or any
pending or contemplated court proceed-
ing has been completed.39 The final de-
cision of the Commission or the State
Bar Court may be reviewed by the appli-
cant in superior court.
40
This entire process-from receipt of
a claim by the CSF to final decision by
the Commission-takes an average of
2.3 years in California.4' The average
lag time between a loss and the filing of
a CSF claim is 3.4 years.42 Thus, in
California, it takes the State Bar almost
six years to complete a disciplinary pro-
ceeding and process a CSF claim.
For an idea of the size of the CSF in
California, consider the following 1986
statistics. The staff assigned to the fund
consists of one director, two attorneys,
two secretaries, one investigator, and
one records coordinator.4 3 In 1986, the
Fund received $885,900 through assess-
ments on 88,590 active attorneys,
44
$71,552 through investment of fund
assets, and $20,500 was recovered
through subrogation.4 5 Four hundred
and sixty-seven claims were received,
totalling $6.9 million in claims. The
fund paid 138 claims in 1986, including
81 claims paid in full.4 6 The total dollar
amount of these paid claims was
$830,000. Historically, the average claim
amount has been $9,967, and the aver-
age claim paid has been $7,699.47 The
ratio of payments to claims amounts for
1983 to 1985 filings was 49%.48 The
CSF started 1987 with 844 claims out-
standing, totalling $8,911,104.65. Five
hundred sixty-seven new claims were
opened, seven closed claims were re-
opened, and 380 were closed. Thus, at
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the conclusion of 1987, there were 1,035





Two objectives or justifications are
commonly cited as the basis for creating
CSFs. The first objective is based on the
belief that the profession as a whole
owes defrauded clients a "debt of
honor."50 The profession represents its
members to the public as "honorable,
learned and skilled," and "when this
trust is betrayed, the profession as a
whole has a duty to rectify the wrong
committed against a client."5' Accord-
ing to the California State Bar, the es-
tablishment of CSFs furthers the legal
profession's role as a "public profession
devoted to serving the public" for whom
the "spirit of public service" acts as its
motivating force.5 2 The client has "re-
lied on the profession's collective repre-
sentation"53 and the profession has an
obligation to remedy the losses stemming
from such reliance.
A number of commentators have
contended, however, that only full re-
imbursement of all clients' losses can
totally repay the professional debt of
honor.54 For these critics judging the
success of existing funds in satisfying
this objective, the extent to which the
funds have reached the goal of full re-
imbursement serves as the primary cri-
terion. Three aspects generally common
to the funds have limited their ability to
attain the objective of full reimburse-
ment: lack of publicity; dollar limita-
tions on the amount of recovery; and
stringent eligibility criteria.
Many funds are deficient in publiciz-
ing their activities. Since clients will
present claims for reimbursement only if
they are aware of the existence of a
CSF, publicity about a fund is essential.
Most states report that their funds are
publicized through "word of mouth",
brochures, periodic news releases, and
local bar associations; few describe an
organized and aggressive public relations
program for their CSFs.55 One disin-
centive to an aggressive publicity cam-
paign is a low level of revenues in most
funds. Why publicize a program which
cannot satisfy its objectives?56 State
bars are also hesitant to openly publi-
cize their CSFs because the publicity
that is essential to a public understand-
ing of the CSF necessarily entails the
revelation of attorney misconduct. Pub-
lic recognition of professional efforts at
reimbursement will be accompanied by
a greater awareness of the extent of
attorney misappropriation.
In addition to inadequate publicity,
express dollar limitations on the awards
of many CSFs also contribute to the
failure of many funds to repay in full
the collective "debt of honor" of the
profession.57 Maintaining the solvency
of the CSF may necessitate payment of
only a portion of the claimed amount of
the loss.58 The client has no recourse in
such a case because CSF awards are
made as a matter of grace and not as a
matter of right.59
Several explanations have been ad-
vanced in support of broad CSF dis-
cretion in determining the amount of
awards and the dollar limitations on
awards to eligible claimants. Rules
granting discretion to CSF trustees have
been justified by the unavailability of
data concerning attorney misappropria-
tions, which prevents the trustees from
accurately estimating the volume and
magnitude of future claims and requires
the trustees to exercise restraint in mak-
ing awards.60 It has also been argued
that the dollar limitations of CSFs are
analogous to the maximum awards pay-
able by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation to depositors.6' Finally,
dollar limitations are defended as tem-
porary provisions to protect new funds
from being "bankrupted" by large
claims.
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The stringent criteria which a claim-
ant must satisfy to be eligible for an
award constitute a third limitation on
the capacity of present CSFs to provide
full reimbursement. All CSFs limit their
reimbursements to losses attributable to
intentional attorney misconduct and do
not reimburse losses due to attorney
negligence.63 However, it is difficult to
distinguish between malpractice and in-
tentional theft in cases where the client
has paid an advance fee for particular
services, and the attorney subsequently
performs few, if any, services while re-
taining all or most of the money. A
number of funds reimburse a client
where no services have been performed
and the retainer has been kept by the
attorney.64 Partial performance of ser-
vices, however, may preclude reimburse-
ment from the CSF for the losses, thus
relegating the client to an entirely
separate set of procedures established
by most bars to arbitrate fee disputes.
Another significant limitation on
awards from the funds is that the loss
must have been suffered in a transaction
occurring within the "attorney-client
relationship." For instance, the profes-
sion does not recognize any obligation
to indemnify losses attributable to a
lawyer when he has defaulted on a loan
from a client or has acted as a business
partner or investment counselor for the
client, rather than as an attorney.
65
Some funds also deny claims resulting
from an attorney's actions in the cap-
acity of an executor, trustee, guardian,
or other kind of fiduciary, provided the
attorney was not acting in her profes-
sional capacity as a lawyer.
66
Finally, many funds require that a
client exhaust his legal remedies against
an attorney before he is eligible for an
award. These legal remedies may in-
clude criminal conviction or successful
completion of disciplinary proceedings
against the offending attorney.67 This
requirement ensures that either a court
or disciplinary agency will determine
whether a client's losses were caused by
a lawyer's dishonest conduct in his
capacity as an attorney, saving the trust-
ees from making such a determination.
However, this also subjects a claimant
to a prolonged delay until final court
action (including appeal) is completed,
which may encourage the client to seek
a private settlement instead of filing a
complaint with the state bar disciplinary
agency and applying to the fund for
compensation.
Some funds do not require that a
client first sue to recover his money, but
require that a claimant enter into a sub-
rogation agreement with the fund, assign-
ing his rights against the defaulting
attorney to the trustees of the fund.
68
A second goal of CSFs arises from
the fact that the legal profession is es-
sentially a self-regulated one. This justi-
fication assumes that the public will
view the suspension or disbarment of an
offending attorney after a misappropria-
tion has occurred as an inadequate re-
sponse by the profession because these
sanctions do not provide restitution to
the client, and the losses of the client are
seldom reimbursed by the attorney.69
Thus, the organized bar views the CSF
as a means of accommodating the public
demand for accountability, while quell-
ing public dissatisfaction and preserving
the freedom of the profession to regu-
late itself without intervention. It is not
clear whether the funds have succeeded
in lessening public dissatisfaction with
the legal profession's self-regulation.70
Recommendations for Change
Primarily, it is critical to recognize
that client security funds-no matter
how well-publicized or successful-can-
not substitute for effective regulation.
Payment from such funds will neither
deter attorney misconduct nor rid the
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profession or dishonest practitioners.
The funds can only complement the
actions of the bar's admissions screen-
ing, post-admissions requirements, and
its disciplinary agency, to remedy the
injuries of clients which could not be
prevented by the bar's efforts at regula-
tion. If the legal profession is to remain
a self-regulated one, then state bar
associations and state legislatures must
work together to ensure that a compre-
hensive, effective regulatory system is
maintained.
7'
Conversely, the failure of CSFs to
achieve the goals justifying their cre-
ation can result in a breakdown of the
attorney discipline system, which relies
heavily on consumer complaints as its
primary source of information. A CSF
process which appears lengthy, cumber-
some, and potentially unrewarding dis-
courages consumer participation or use,
and in fact encourages the possibility of
privatizing the dispute between the
client and attorney. In order to maxi-
mize the opportunity for restitution, an
aggrieved client or an attorney subse-
quently retained to represent the client
may seek a private settlement with the
offending attorney rather than filing a
disciplinary charge.72 Even where there
is the possibility of an award from a
CSF, the client may still seek a private
settlement.
A decision by clients to seek private
settlement rather than to file a disci-
plinary complaint weakens the scope
and efficiency of professional discipline
by failing to prevent or deter the mis-
appropriating attorney from engaging in
further embezzlements. Moreover, the
pressure on the attorney to make resti-
tution to a complaining client in order
to avoid disciplinary penalties may
jeopardize the monies of other clients of
the attorney. Private settlement without
reporting thus undermines the profes-
sion's efforts to discipline misappropri-
ating attorneys.
73
Thus, it appears that the legal pro-
fession needs CSFs-to compensate
victims of attorney dishonesty and pre-
serve the integrity of the profession in
the eyes of the public, and because pro-
fessional malpractice insurance (even
where required) does not generally cover
intentional acts. And, the CSFs must be
truly responsive to consumer needs, or
they will partially contribute to a break-
down of the attorney discipline system.
Strengthening the profession's response
to attorney misappropriation may be
accomplished in two general areas.
Prevention. A number of states, par-
ticularly those with mandatory continu-
ing legal education requirements,
sponsor educational programs on record-
keeping, law office management, and
legal ethics.74 As a preventive measure,
such programs assume that the misappro-
priation of funds is the result of poor
recordkeeping or, at worst, negligence.
To the extent that the misconduct is not
intentional, educational programs may
be valuable; at the very least, they will
put attorneys on notice regarding the
minimum recordkeeping required of them.
Rule 1.15 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct requires an attor-
ney to keep "complete records" of all
funds received from clients. Several
states have elaborated on this require-
ment by promulgating detailed descrip-
tions of the kinds of records and book-
keeping procedures which constitute
"complete records." While each juris-
diction has established different re-
quirements, the policies behind the re-
quirements are similar. First, a clear
explanation of precisely what is required
of an attorney in terms of bookkeeping
may have a deterrent effect. Second, a
thorough recordkeeping requirement
could prove invaluable to disciplinary
investigations into complaints of mis-
appropriation.
Any deterrent effect of requiring de-
tailed bookkeeping could be greatly
enhanced by a system of random audits
of client trust accounts. Six states con-
duct such audits and five more are con-
sidering the idea.75 A program of audits
combined with a useful set of accounting
guidelines could provide disorganized
attorneys with the motivation and the
means to maintain adequate records. In
addition, the threat of an audit may
deter an attorney considering an un-
authorized "loan" from a client account.
Finally, an audit could detect cases of
intentional misappropriation before the
client trust accounts have been substan-
tially depleted.
Overdraft notification is another
means by which "negligent" attorneys
may be made aware of a recordkeeping
problem before it becomes unmanage-
able. Four states currently have over-
draft notification programs, and an
additional eight states have the idea
under consideration.76 The ABA's Stand-
ing Committee on Clients' Security
Funds has been monitoring the utility of
both random audits and overdraft noti-
fication. Apparently, the states with
such programs find them to be effective,
for the Committee is considering the
inclusion of both random audits and
overdraft notification in the ABA's re-
vised Model Rules for Clients' Security
Funds.77
Administration of CSFs. Many
CSFs, including California's, appear to
be plagued by insufficient funds, lack of
publicity, and unacceptable delays in
processing claims.
If any fund is going to serve the dual
functions of providing restitution to
clients and protecting the integrity of
the legal profession, it must have ade-
quate funds. Implementing a CSF but
failing to actually pay claims because of
insufficient revenues creates a very nega-
tive image in the public eye. Some CSFs
have been relatively effective in raising
funds. Almost all CSFs assess attorneys
licensed to practice in the state. Nine
states receive a budget appropriation in
addition to assessment revenues.78 Such
a combination of resources not only
enhances fund reserves, but reflects favor-
ably on the entity making the appro-
priation.
One source of revenue which the
states have utilized to varying degrees is
the offending attorney. Ensuring resti-
tution may be accomplished either
through the discipline imposed, or
through actions brought subsequent to
the disciplinary proceeding. For exam-
ple, New Jersey reports that in most
cases the discipline imposed for mis-
appropriation is disbarment. However,
in those cases where the respondent is
not disbarred, restitution is always
ordered as a condition of full reinstate-
ment. In addition, the CSF files suit
against any respondent on whose ac-
count the fund has paid claims.79 Final-
ly, the New Jersey CSF pursues third-
party collateral sources, such as title
insurance and depository banks in
forged endorsement cases.80 With the
cooperation of state legislatures, CSFs
could assume the position of a creditor,
and restitution to the fund could be-
come a priority payment like child sup-
port payments and tax liabilities.8'
Next, CSFs must adequately publi-
cize their existence, scope, and proced-
ures. Most state bar discipline agencies
assign a code or otherwise categorize
consumer complaints according to the
type of attorney misconduct alleged; it
would not be difficult to mail an infor-
mative brochure to all clients complain-
ing of misappropriation upon receipt of
the complaint.8 2 Such a publicity pro-
gram would not appreciably increase the
general public awareness of attorney
misconduct; complaining witnesses are
already keenly aware of it.
The processing time for claims is
another area where improvement is
needed in many states. As noted, Cali-
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fornia's average processing time is 2.3
years,83 because of its general policy of
waiting until discipline is imposed on an
attorney before considering CSF reim-
bursement. A significant amount of time
could be saved by consolidating appro-
priate CSF claims with a concurrent
disciplinary proceeding. California's
CSF Rules of Procedure provide for
this, but such a time-saving measure has
not been recently utilized.8 4 To the ex-
tent that this delay is also attributable
to insufficient staffing of CSFs, state
bar disciplinary agencies should closely
examine their CSF workloads and case
backlogs, and provide adequate staff
resources.8 5
Conclusion
Client security funds, by compen-
sating for the losses of clients that the
disciplinary system and malpractice insur-
ance fail to address, complement tradi-
tional efforts at self-regulation. The
funds, however, are strictly remedial
and not preventive. If the legal profes-
sion intends to remain a self-regulated
profession, attorneys, state bar associa-
tions and state legislatures must work
together to effectively prevent attorney
misconduct.
It also appears clear that state bars
should focus more attention and re-
sources on creating properly-function-
ing, responsive CSFs. The CSF is the
last resort for innocent client-victims
who are truly deserving of recompense.
Neither these victims nor CSFs should
be treated as the forgotten stepchildren
of the attorney discipline system.
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31. Rule 20(d), CSF Rules of Pro-
cedure.
32. Rule 14(b), CSF Rules of Pro-
cedure.
33. Rule 16(b)(2), CSF Rules of Pro-
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Interview, supra note 23.
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35. Rule 14(c), CSF Rules of Pro-
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36. Rule 15(b), CSF Rules of Pro-
cedure.
37. Id.
38. Rule 15(c), CSF Rules of Pro-
cedure.
39. Rule 15(d), CSF Rules of Pro-
cedure.
40. Rule 17, CSF Rules of Procedure.
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bility (April 15, 1988) (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "Webb Interview').
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range from $5,000 (six states) to
$100,000 (New York). A few states re-
port no limit on payment per claim, and
others state the maximum payment in
terms of a percentage; e.g., 10% of fund
balance in any year. CSF Survey, supra
note 5, at 25-29.
The maximum allowable payment in
California is $50,000 if the loss occurred
after January 1, 1982, and $25,000 for
losses which occurred after March 4,
1972 and before January 1, 1982. Rule
4(b), CSF Rules of Procedure. Only one
maximum amount is allowed, regardless
of the number of losses suffered during
the course of any one engagement for
services. Rule 4(a), CSF Rules of Pro-
cedure.
58. Some funds have attempted to
avoid this problem by establishing a
percentage of the fund balance as the
maximum payment. For example, the
Arkansas CSF limits payment to the
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CSF Survey, supra note 5, at 25-29.
59. Rule 2, CSF Rules of Procedure.
60. Webb Interview, supra note 56.
61. Smith, supra note 50, at 128.
62. Id.
63. It is generally believed that losses
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best compensated through the malprac-
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insurance is not required in many states,
and a lack of insurance plus the refusal
of CSFs to consider negligence claims
or compensation/ reimbursement for un-
satisfied civil malpractice judgments
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remedy.
64. See, e.g., Rule 6(b), CSF Rules
of Procedure, which includes the follow-
ing: "Refusal to refund unearned fees
received in advance where the lawyer
performed no services or such an insig-
nificant portion of the service that the
refusal to refund the unearned fees con-
stitutes a wrongful taking or conversion
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65. Rule 10 of the CSF Rules of
Procedure excludes losses occasioned by
a loan or investment transaction unless
it arose out of and in the course of the
attorney-client relationship. The rule
adopts a "but for" standard; but for the
fact that the dishonest attorney enjoyed
a privileged relationship with the client,
the loss would not have occurred. See
Rule 10(a)-(e), CSF Rules of Procedure.
66. In California, the lawyer dis-
honestly causing the loss must have
been acting as a lawyer; in a fiduciary
capacity "customary to the practice of
law," such as an administrator, execu-
tor, trustee of an express trust, guard-
ian, or conservator; or as an escrow
holder or other fiduciary, having been
designated as such as a result of the
attorney-client relationship. Rule 9,
CSF Rules of Procedure.
67. Prior discipline is required in 26
states. CSF Survey, supra note 5, at 34-
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incompetence is generally a prerequisite
to recovery, but this requirement may
be waived. Rule 9(b), CSF Rules of
Procedure. A few states may order res-
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where the attorney has not been disbar-
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condition or reinstatement. An order of
restitution is also sought as part of sen-
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CSF Survey, supra note 5, at 30-33.
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ment on a claim. CSF Survey, supra
note 5, at 30-33.
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payments. CSF Actuarial Study, supra
note 42, at 4.
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point because public dissatisfaction is
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differ greatly from state to state. That
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awareness. Webb Interview, supra note
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gatory powers, to study the State Bar's
discipline system over a multi-year peri-
od, and to advocate recommendations
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Professions Code section 6086.9. For a
condensed version of the Initial Report
of the State Bar Discipline Monitor, see
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Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 1987) at 1.
72. Under the ABA rules, attorneys
retained by clients seeking restitution
from another attorney must report the
offending attorney's conduct. "A lawyer
having knowledge that another lawyer
has committed a violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
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Rule 8.3(a), ABA Rules of Professional
Conduct.
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Business and Professions Code prohibits
attorneys from requiring an agreement
not to report in exchange for private
settlement of a misappropriation case.
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Bar, or to cease cooperating with the
State Bar as a condition of settlement.
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over three-year periods, of which at
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legal ethics and law practice manage-
ment. However, legislation to impose a
$5 Bar dues surcharge to cover the costs
of administering the CLE program was
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whenever an NSF check is written on a
client trust fund account. See supra note
20.
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78. CSF Survey, supra note 5, at
11-13.
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33. Both Idaho and Nevada also require
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80. Id.
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ing drafting legislative models to serve
as guidelines for the states. Strengthen-
ing the creditor position of the CSF
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of factions, and would require a change
in Bankruptcy Code. Webb Interview,
supra note 56.
The California legislature recently
enacted AB 3089 (Connelly), which sub-
rogates the CSF to the rights of a
successful CSF applicant against the
attorney whose dishonest conduct caused
the pecuniary loss to the Fund, and
authorizes the Bar to bring an action
against the attorney causing the loss
within three years from the date of pay-
ment to the applicant. The Governor
has signed AB 3089 (Chapter 484, Stat-
utes of 1988).
82. The State Office of the Auditor
General recently made the same recom-
mendation. In a June 1988 report, the
Auditor General found that the Bar was
not routinely informing complainants of
the existence of the CSF, and recom-
mended that the Bar "should inform
potential claimants of the availability of
the Client Security Fund when they file
a formal complaint that an attorney has
misused trust funds." Office of the
Auditor General, A Review of the State
Bar of California's Processing of Com-
plaints Against Attorneys Accused of
Misusing Client Trust Funds, Audit
No. P-716 (June 1988) at 23. (For a com-
plete summary of the Auditor General's
report, see infra agency update on OFF-
ICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL.)
83. CSF Survey, supra note 5, at
21-24.
84. Letter from Kiyoko Tatsui to
State Bar Discipline Monitor Robert C.
Fellmeth, supra note 23, at 4.
In his Third Progress Report of the
State Bar Discipline Monitor (Septem-
ber 1988), Professor Fellmeth makes a
similar recommendation: "We believe
that CSF claims should be combined
with the discipline process, with [the
Office of Trial Counsel] carrying the
case as part of the underlying discipline.
Where there is a settlement or judgment,
resolution of the CSF claim and any.
concomitant duty of the respondent to
contribute should be included." Id. at
155-56.
For its part, the California CSF
Commission has adopted an "early pay-
out policy," under which it will examine
claims before final discipline is imposed
but after the attorney has become the
subject of an interim suspension pro-
ceeding under Business and Professions
Code section 6007(b) or (c), or the Off-
ice of Trial Counsel has filed a formal
accusation or a stipulation as to facts
and discipline against the attorney. This
limited acceleration of claim review,
however, has been inhibited by a large
backlog of cases currently pending be-
fore the CSF.
85. Since 1986, the California CSF
has added two staff members: a para-
legal and an administrative assistant.
See supra text at notes 43-49.
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